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MFA NEGOTIATIONS 1983
The MFA is the oldest of the organised restrictions on free trade in
manufactures violating the normal GATT principles and discriminating against
Third World (and via parallel arrangements Socialist) countries and in 
favour of industrial capitalist countries (especially within EEC but also in 
EEC - North American trade).
Background
The multi fibres arrangements (MFA) were - over a decade ago - created as a 
short term, disruption avoiding measure for certain cotton textiles and 
garments . They then allowed 6% physical growth per year and were expected 
to last less than five years. They were created as a GATT framework arrangement 
because outside GATT they would be a clear violation of GATT obligations.
The course of the MFA has been very different from anticipations:
a. coverage has grown to comprehend virtually all textiles and 
garments of all fibres;
b. allowed growth rates have been cut to near nil for the 1983-86
'agreement' and since the 1983 allowed base is below 1980-82 actuals
in fact the true growth rate in several key categories for the dominant 
suppliers is negative;
c. there has been a burgeoning of provisions allowing importing states 
to block imports even within quotas (eg "anti-surge”) and to prevent 
swings of products from a full to an underused allocation preventing 
full utilisation of quota;
d. the industrial economies have no intention of phasing out MFA in the 
forseeable future;
e. parallel arrangements are negotiated with Taiwan, China, CMEA members, 
Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia;
f. MFA regulations now merely set ceilings - individual OECD states (or
in the case of "Little Europe" the EEC) negotiate lower actual operating 
agreements with single I d c ’s on a bilateral (or "one against all" in 
the EEC-ldc case) basis.
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1982
The 1982 MFA frame negotiations are set out in "The Multifibre Arrangement" 
by B. Baker. They were bitterly contested and barely agreed.
EEC has introduced a new card in its bilateral MFA wheeling and dealing.
This is "outward processing" le the contracted turning of grey into finished 
cloth or cloth into garments by a firm in an ldc for return to EEC.
In the EEC case this is on the basis of the EEC firm (which must be a textile 
producer not a pure trader - with a handful of "grandfather clause" exceptions) 
contracting to provide the cloth, specify the product and buy back the goods.
It is not possible for the ldc firm to take the initiative. (There is a 
parallel USA system which is less rigidly tied to existing USA textile or 
garment firms and allows greater ldc initiatives.)
"Outward processing" cloth and garments (because of origin of basic cloth) do 
not count against MFA quotas. In the current round the EEC has sought a 
de facto linkage by offering "outward processing" quotas (or potential quotas 
as EEC based firms not the Commission or the ldc "quota holder" will decide 
whether they can, in fact, be used) as a substitute for MFA quota increases.
This evolution is set out in B. Faruqi, "The EEC Outward Processing Regulation 
In Toxtiles And The Negotiating Options For Developing Countries."
Lome II and the Mahgreb arrangements (with Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco) initially 
appeared to give free or liberally defined access to textile and garment exports 
from these countries to EEC. Tunisia, Morocco and Ivory Coast built up 
substantial garment production on that basis usually through location in their 
countries of branches of or joint ventures with EEC based (usually French) 
firms. EEC has now involved "disruption" and "orderly marketing" let out 
clauses to halt growth of - and in some cases, eg Tunisian shirts, Ivoirienne 
jeans, to reduce absolutely - such exports. This is likely to be an issue 
on the ACP side in negotiations for Lome III, EEC-ACP trade is discussed in 
J. Moss and J. Ravenhill, ’"Trade Between the ACP And EEC during Lome I."
The Negotiating Context and Actors
The frame MFA is concluded. What remains is to negotiate bilateral EEC 
arrangements with individual l d c ’s - with or without "outward processing"
coverage and with or without "side” agreements (eg in respect to Lome III).
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Actors:
I . EEC - Commission
i r . Federal Germany
h i  . Netherlands
IV. France
V. United Kingdom
i. Yugoslavia
2. India
3. Hong Kong
4. Sri Lanka
5. Philippines
6. Tunisia
7. Ivory Coast
8. ACP Secretariat
Any EEC state may approach any ldc state (or the ACP Secretariat) and vice 
versa. EEC states may act jointly throughout but must conclude actual bilateral 
agreements jointly as EEC. Ldc's may negotiate with EEC as a group throughout 
or seek support from particular EEC members first. They may coordinate 
tactics and seek to require that EEC negotiate with all (or a sub-set eg 
Tunisia, Ivory Coast, ACP Secretariat) together not one by one. Realistic 
preparation of positions requires attention to the three articles cited and/or 
to comparable studies.
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